ABSTRACT. While a dominated choice involves a situation in which one option clearly dominates another on all relevant dimensions, an asymmetrically dominated choice typically arises where at least two options do not dominate each other and one (but not both) of those options does dominate a third option. We demonstrate that the introduction of such an asymmetrically dominated option can have a significant impact upon choices between non-dominated options within the same choice set for nonmarket goods. Furthermore, we show that this effect can then translate into significant impacts upon subsequent valuations for those non-dominated options. (JEL Q51)
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of ''anomalies'' observed in stated preference studies for non-market goods have subsequently been found to occur in purchases of marketpriced goods (see, e.g., the ''part-whole'' effect; Diamond and Hausman 1994; Bateman et al. 1997) . In this paper, we reverse this demonstrative flow by examining whether a particular choice set phenomenon widely demonstrated in the marketing and psychological literatures, and borne out in experimental economic settings and real market observations, carries over to hypothetical non-market valuation and public goods choice settings. Our particular focus here is on so-called ''asymmetric dominance'' effects. While a dominated choice involves a situation in which one option clearly dominates another on all relevant dimensions, an asymmetrically dominated choice typically involves more than two options in which one option is dominated by at least one other option, but not by all options. Figure 1 illustrates asymmetric dominance in the case where options vary along two dimensions, which are labelled in accordance with the goods that are discussed later in the article. In this figure, d is dominated by t, but not by c. An asymmetric dominance effect is an example of a broader class of decoy phenomena (Herne 1997 (Herne , 1999 , which refer to the effects on choices between two options (the target t and the competitor c) that results from the introduction of an additional option (the decoy d). When the addition of such a decoy increases the choice share of the target, then an asymmetric dominance effect is said to have occurred (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) .
Decoy effects in general, and asymmetric dominance effects in particular, have attracted the attention of psychologists and experimental economists because rational choice theory posits that preferences be-tween two options should not depend upon the presence or absence of any other option. It follows that if t is not chosen from a binary choice set B 5 {c, t}, then t cannot be the preferred choice in the more encompassing choice set E 5 {c,t,d}. This principle, known as expansion consistency (Sen 1982) , is embodied in standard models of rational choice (Tversky and Simonson 1993) and, given monotonicity, implies the absence of asymmetric dominance effects. At an aggregate level, the parallel to the expansion consistency restrictions on individual choice is the regularity condition (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) . Formally, letting C (B) 5 c denote that alternative c is chosen from the choice set B and P(c, B) indicate the proportion of people for whom C (B) 5 c, the regularity condition is defined as P c, B ð Þ § P c, E ð Þ:
Regularity is a weaker condition than expansion consistency, because even when regularity holds at the aggregate levels, individuals may still violate expansion consistency. Nevertheless, from the perspective of choice experiments, regularity remains a minimally desirable condition. It follows that failure of the regularity condition, in the form of an asymmetric dominance effect, may have consequences for choice experiments. Evidence of asymmetric dominance effects are widely demonstrated in the experimental and consumer choice literature (see, e.g., Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Ranteshwar, Shocker, and Stewart 1987; Lehman and Pan 1994) . As an example, Rabin (1998) discusses an asymmetric dominance experiment conducted by Simonson and Tversky (1992) that examined choices between receiving $6 and a Cross pen. (Cross is a manufacturer of elegant pens in the United States.)
While only 36 percent of the subjects choosing only between the Cross pen and $6 chose the Cross pen, 46 percent of subjects who were also given the choice of a less attractive pen chose the Cross pen . . . the addition of an option that compared unfavorably (as more expensive or lower quality) to an existing option enhanced the perceived attractiveness of the existing option (p. 38) Other researchers have demonstrated that such effects appear to be general, and extend to other choice situations such as political candidates (Pan, O'Curry, and Pitts 1995), job candidates (Highhouse 1996) and policy issues (Herne 1997) . While much of this research has utilized hypothetical choice tasks, Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Herne (1999) demonstrate that asymmetric dominance effects persist in choice experiments involving real incentives. More recently asymmetric dominance effects have been observed in real markets for commonly purchased goods. An interesting example of such phenomena is provided by Doyle et al. (1999) , who conduct a real world investigation regarding purchases of tins of baked beans in a supermarket. Here the researchers initially monitored sales of two brands of beans, both sold in the same large can size, over the course of a week. This showed that one brand, which we can designate as Brand X, accounted for just 19% of sales despite being cheaper than the leading brand. The researchers then introduced a decoy good, namely a line of small tins of Brand X sold at the same price as a large can. Sales from the following week showed that, while (unsurprisingly) no purchases of the decoy were made, market share of Brand X had increased significantly (p 5 0.034) to 33% of sales so cutting sales of the leading brand from 81% to 67%.
The fact that the asymmetric dominance effect increases the relative (and in some cases the absolute) proportion of choices favoring the more proximate target, runs counter to the ''similarity hypothesis'' that new items take share from existing items that are the most similar (Tversky 1972) . Efforts by psychologists and market researchers to explain this phenomenon can be broadly categorized as perceptual effects and decisionmaking processes.
1 With regards to the former, the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy extends the unfavorable dimension of the target more than the favorable dimension, making the target's deficit in the unfavorable dimension seem less great (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Huber and Puto 1983) . Increased frequency of items in the dimension on which the target is superior may increase the weight placed on that dimension (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982) . With respect to decisionmaking processes, Simonson (1989) argues that individuals seek to justify their choices in the face of uncertainty, especially in cases where they may be concerned about external evaluation of their decisions: the target may be more ''attractive'' because its superiority is unambiguous and independent of subjective preferences; the target may be regarded as a ''compromise'' that combines desirable attributes of the other choices. Underlying decision processes may be driven by an ''extremeness aversion' ' (Simonsen and Tversky 1992) or the application of simplifying decision heuristics to minimize decision costs (Wedell 1991) . Wedell (1991) identifies further psychological, decision-making processes that may engender such effects.
It is evident, however, that the asymmetric dominance effect is not isolated to the human psyche-it may be that we are ''hard wired'' to make choices using comparative, context-dependent criteria rather than to value options independently. Shafir, Waite, and Smith (2002) 
note:
We tested the choices of honeybees and gray jays in binary and trinary contexts. According to the theories of rational choice and optimal foraging, the subjective values assigned to two preexisting options should not be affected by the presence or absence of a third option. However, our subjects were affected by the presence of an asymmetrically dominated decoy just like human subjects. (p. 185) Given the clear impact on familiar and regularly purchased products in humans and replication in foraging by other species, we feel justified in investigating whether this effect will replicate for less familiar environmental non-market goods for which preferences should, if anything, be more malleable.
Our research extends the literature on asymmetric dominance in two key ways: first by demonstrating that this phenome-1 A further interpretation might be that the presence of a decoy is regarded by respondents as having informational content; e.g., that the target option is technically more feasible. However, such an interpretation is not evident in the asymmetric dominance literature and is merely reported as a possibility here. 
II. DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
A novel case study was undertaken exclusively in order to investigate the potential for asymmetric dominance effects in non-market choice and valuation. This case study focussed upon proposed environmental management strategy options for Ranworth Broad in Norfolk, U.K. (a Broad is a colloquial term for lake). In an in-person, on-site survey of visitors to the lake, respondents were presented with information concerning two distinct environmental attributes (A1, A2) which were increased from present day levels by different extents: the first attribute (A1) concerned an increase in the number of birds at the lake; the second attribute (A2) concerned an increase in the amount of plant cover around the lake. Increases in attribute A1 were measured as numbers of additional birds whereas increases in attribute A2 were measured as percentages of plant cover over the current level. The analysis presented in this paper concerns responses to linked choice and valuation questions, both concerning changes in bird numbers and plant cover detailed above. The choice task was presented prior to the valuation task with a principle aim being to see (1) if asymmetric dominance effects occurred in the former, and if so, (2) whether such an effect would then impact upon a subsequent valuation task concerning the same provision change.
A split-sample design was employed with one subsample being presented with a choice between options c 5 (100, 30) and t 5 (150, 20) , that is, the choice set {c,t}. The second subsample was offered an expanded choice set {c,t,d}, that is c and t (defined exactly as before) plus d 5 (140, 15).
2 As demonstrated in Figure 1 , d is dominated in both dimensions by t. In contrast the movement in outcome space from c to d would involve an increase in A1 by 40 and a decrease in A2 by 15. Thus, d is dominated by t but not c.
In both subsamples, respondents made their decisions based upon numerical information presented to them on a showcard (letters c, t, and d were not used on the cards). The cards were structured in a table format so as to make assimilation of the information as easy as possible. In the costless choice task respondents were simply asked to identify their preferred option from the two or three presented to them. The subsequent valuation exercise used a simple open-ended question to elicit willingness to pay for the chosen (preferred) option, 3 payment being made via a general tax vehicle as used in previous in-person CV survey research on the Norfolk Broads (Bateman et al. 1995) .
The questionnaire survey was conducted at the nearby Ranworth Broad Nature Reserve visitor center employing face-toface interviewing techniques. Members of the public who agreed to respond to a tenminute questionnaire were, unbeknown to them, assigned at random to one of the two treatments. The refusal rate was only 4% reflecting the prior commitment of visitors to this area. A total of 294 subjects were interviewed. Prior to each decision task, all respondents were provided with some background information regarding the scenario. This material was designed so as to be as unbiased towards any particular attribute as possible. Furthermore, it was emphasized that there were no correct answers and that the respondent should respond according to their own preferences. As will be demonstrated later, the random assignment of surveys provided samples with statistically identical characteristics.
Given this data, we examine four hypotheses. The first tests the null of description invariance, with the alternative hypothesis being that the regularity conditions are violated. Formally,
Hypothesis H o 1 states that the probability of choosing the target good t does not vary systematically according to whether or not the dominated decoy d is present or absent in the choice set; it tests the standard assertion that d is an irrelevant alternative. Testing H o 1 is accomplished by standard contingency table analyses to test whether the relative shares of t and c change with the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy. A one-sided test of proportions is used to explore the alternative hypothesis that the regularity condition is violated for the target t with the presence of the decoy increasing the proportion choosing that target.
The second hypothesis involves conditional tests of asymmetric dominance effects upon choice. This is assessed by modelling individual choice as a function of covariates. Formally this hypothesis is stated as follows:
where w is a vector of exogenous preferencerelated and socio-economic covariates of respondents. To model this, let z represent an indicator variable of preference for t or c, such that z 5 1 if the individual chooses t and z 5 0 if they choose c. 
4 Under the assumption of rationality, nobody should ever choose d (as discussed subsequently, this only occurred once and this observation was excluded from analysis) and its inclusion within the model merely allows for its effect on the propensity to choose t or c.
3 While we acknowledge that the open-ended elicitation format lacks the claimed desirable incentive compatibility properties of the discrete response approach (although this claim is disputed and empirical evidence is mixed; see, e.g., Cummings et al. 1997; Loomis et al. 1997; Taylor et al 2001; Burton et al. 2007 ), the open ended continues to be used in methodological studies (see, e.g., Bateman et al. 2004; Heberlein et al. 2005) . In part this continued use arises within experimental situations where the focus is upon relative differences in values across treatments. Here the fact that the strategy space afforded by the open-ended format may downwardly bias responses is a lesser concern and the statistical efficiency of the approach makes it a desirable option. That said, we acknowledge that the potential for strategic behavior may downwardly bias open-ended WTP responses and feel that the format is best used for methodological experimentation rather than for estimating policy values.
In Equation [1] a and d are coefficients to be estimated. The significance of d, the coefficient on the binary decoy variable, provides the test of whether the null hypotheses H o 2 can be rejected in a manner consistent with an asymmetric dominance effect. This, in conjunction with the sign of the coefficient, provides insight into whether or not the alternative hypothesis should be accepted. The estimated model will be referred to as the choice model. As will be discussed later, this basic model can be expanded to explore possible interactions between w and d.
In our third and final hypothesis test, we examine the procedural variance null hypothesis that values are not affected by the addition of a decoy to the choice set. Specifically, we examine whether stated values, or willingness to pay (WTP), for the preferred choice vary with the choice set,
Because expectations associated with this test may depend upon the outcome of the previous hypotheses, and because of the possibility of preference reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Irwin et al. 1993) , no alternative directional hypothesis is specified at this point. Nevertheless, the empirical direction of any impact remains a primary interest of this research, as will be discussed.
To investigate this third hypothesis, we can conceive of separate WTP functions for c and t. Letting i indicate an individual and x be a vector of covariates, then our equations of interest are
and
where b and z are coefficients to be estimated and e represents an error term.
We will refer to equations [2a] and [2b] as conditional willingness-to-pay models. As will be discussed later, each of the conditional willingness-to-pay models can be expanded to include interaction effects between x i and d i . Statistical tests associated with Hypothesis 3 are two-fold: first, the significance of z p relative to the null hypothesis z p 5 0 for p 5 c,t; second, estimated mean willingness to pay WTP for each treatment is compared relative to the null hypothesis WTP p,d~1~W TP p, d~0 for p 5 c,t.
The nature of our data, however, is such that WTP c and WTP t are not observed for all individuals; rather, stated WTP i is conditional on the choice of t or c made by the individual in the ''first step,'' or choice opportunity, of our elicitation mechanism as detailed in the first two hypotheses. 5 Similarly, x ci and x ti are only observed if their respective choice has been made. To appropriately estimate each conditional willingness-to-pay function, it is necessary to account for the self-selection that occurs at the first stage. Here we account for this endogeneity following what Madalla (1983) has generally termed endogenous switching models.
To accommodate the data in this study and to avoid bias in the estimation of the relationship represented in equations [2a] and [2b], the conditional willingness-to-pay model needs to be further modified. Although individuals identify a preferred costless choice between c and t, this need not imply that they have a positive willingness to pay for the preferred choice. For example, individuals may prefer the status quo. Indeed, over 16% (44/269) of the willingness-to-pay responses were zeros. Given this censoring, along with the assumption that e is otherwise distributed normally, a Tobit model, with a lower limit of zero, is appropriate.
Given the above censoring and endogenous switching issues, Equations [1] and [2] can be linked and restated with the following model using a Tobit formulation in the second step, willingness-to-pay model:
where WTP* is latent willingness-to-pay, u i and e i are distributed bivariate normal with zero means, and respective standard deviations s u 5 1, s ce and s te . The estimated coefficients, r uc and r ut , represent the respective correlations between u and e ci and e ti (Madalla 1983; Greene 2002) . The willingness-to-pay specification in equation [3] will be referred to as the corrected willingness-to-pay model. While w and x are indicated separately in Equation [3] , all of the reported models reported herein set w 5 x, which is motivated by the intuition that willingness to pay should be driven by the same utility components as choice. 6 Further, this restriction allows tests of consistency between the choice and conditional willingness-topay stages of the elicitation process in a manner consistent with ''mover-stayer'' modelling found in the labor economics literature.
III. RESULTS

Regularity Test of Asymmetric Dominance Effects on Choice Shares: H 1
Table 1 details the choice shares for the various options offered to our two-choice task subsamples. Consideration of these findings reveals clear evidence of asymmetric dominance effects with respect to the regularity condition. When no decoy is included in the choice set, the choices between target and competitor are evenly split. With the addition of the asymmetrically dominated decoy, it is evident that the choice shares change substantially with the proportion of respondents choosing t increasing noticeably. Only one of the respondents acted ''irrationally,'' choosing the decoy rather than the preferred alternative. This individual is excluded from subsequent analyses. Using standard chisquare tests, the choice shares of c and t are significantly different ( Binomial Probit selection models allowing for exogenous socio-economic covariates are provided in Table 3 using both the full sample and the observations for which WTP values were reported. The two membership covariates tend to shift choices in alternative directions: membership in the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) is associated with a rise in the likelihood of choosing the alternative that favored birds (a reassuringly common sense result); membership in less specific ''Green'' organizations such as Friends of the Earth is correlated with choosing the competitor (more plants-again this seems a plausible and interesting result). As might be expected for a costless choice, the coefficient on income is not significant in the choice models. Moreover, frequency of visits does not affect choice between c and t.
Given these covariates, the probit results demonstrate significant impacts of adding the decoy to the choice set (p , 0.01) as demonstrated by the coefficient on the ''With Decoy'' variable. As such, H o 2 , the null hypothesis of no asymmetric dominance effect, can be rejected. The positive and significant sign on the ''With Decoy'' variable further suggests that asymmetric dominance effects observed in other choice settings can be extended to the realm of hypothetical tradeoffs between environmental goods. Notes: Cell contents are counts with corresponding subsample proportions are given in parentheses. As defined in the text and demonstrated in Figure 1 , c refers to the competitor, t refers to the target, and d refers to the decoy. Note that d is asymmetrically dominated by t. It may be that the addition of a decoy affects the propensity to choose t over c differently across individuals. To explore the possibility that the effect of d on the propensity to chose t will differ systematically with other model covariates, the binary variable d was interacted with the variables in w to create a vector of ''slope shifting'' variables w*d. Using a standard likelihood ratio test, the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on w*d were significantly different from zero was rejected (LR 4 5 1.87, p 5 0.76). As a result, we adopt the intercept shift model depicted in equation [1] and Table 3 for our analyses related to Hypothesis 3.
Expansion of the Choice Set and WTP -H3
Reported average WTP values by choice set and choice are provided in Table 4 . Examination of this 2 3 2 matrix of values suggests that, ignoring for the moment issues of endogeneity, average WTP for t is higher than average WTP for c, and that the addition of the decoy increases the average WTP for t. For this raw WTP data, there appears to be a smaller downward effect on average WTP for c when a decoy d, asymmetrically dominated by t, is added.
The choice model described above was expanded to the endogenous switching framework specified in equation [3] . 8 This model is presented in Table 5 in which the upper portion provides the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates of the choice coefficients, the middle sections report the conditional willingness-to-pay models for the target and competitor, respectively, and the lower section reports the ancillary parameters and other model statistics.
The estimated coefficients of the FIML choice model proximate those reported in Table 3 , although the significance levels on two of the coefficients have changed: the coefficient on income was not significant in the costless choice, but in the WTP response is significant at the 5% level; the significance of the with-decoy coefficient fell to 5% significance level from 1%. The notable elements of the ancillary parameters are the high positive (negative) correlation between the errors in the choice and target (competitor) willingness-to-pay models. The fact that r is statistically significant suggests that the failure to acknowledge the endogeneity of the choice would lead to a biased estimate of the conditional willingness-topay models. These significant parameters mean that there are unobserved characteristics of individuals that simultaneously (1) make them more (less) likely (than their observed characteristics would suggest) to choose the target (competitor), and (2) leave them with a higher (lower) willingness to pay than their observed characteristics would suggest. Unobserved characteristics that make people more likely to ''Choose t'' also contribute to them expressing higher WTP amounts. Similarly, unobserved characteristics that make people more likely to ''Choose c'' also contribute to them expressing lower WTP amounts.
In the conditional willingness-to-pay models, the coefficients on household income and frequent visitors are positive, as expected, and significant in both models. The coefficient for RSPB and Greens are significant and follow expected signs for each model. Membership in RSPB is positively correlated with willingness to pay for the target program, which favors bird populations, and negatively correlated with the competitor program favoring flora. The willingness to pay by those identified as GREENS follows the opposite pattern.
9
Income and frequency of visits are each significant and positive, reflecting standard expectations for willingness to pay for recreational experiences.
Focusing on the ''With Decoy'' effect, we see that adding a decoy has a large and statistically significant effect on willingness to pay for t. To put this is in an economic perspective, note that the size of the decoy effect is of a similar order of magnitude as being a member of RSPB. In contrast, the inclusion of a decoy in the choice set has a negative, but not significant effect on willingness to pay for c.
10,11
Using predicted values E(WTP i |x i ) associated with each of the sub-samples corresponding to the 2 3 2 matrix indicated in Table 4 , the estimated conditional mean willingness to pay values (and corresponding standard deviations) are 13.02 (9.96), 18.40 (17.10), 12.69 (9.13), and 26.40 (17.16) for the ''No Decoy''/Chose c, ''No Decoy''/ Chose t, ''With Decoy''/Chose c, and ''With Decoy''/Chose samples, respectively. These predicted, sample specific and treatment corrected values mirror trends observed in the raw data and the estimated models: the addition of a decoy has a strong and significant upward effect on willingness to pay for the target t (p 5 0.004) while there is some, albeit statistically insignificant (p 5 0.86), evidence of a downward effect on WTP for the competitor for this sample.
Taken together, the results of testing and rejecting H o 3 are suggestive, providing evidence that expansion of the choice set to include an asymmetrically dominated option will affect estimates of the relative trade-offs, or marginal rates of substitution, between goods. Specifically, ceteris paribus, willingness to pay for the targeted good rises with the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy.
V. DISCUSSION
Using a case study of proposed environmental management strategy options for a lake, this research demonstrates that the asymmetric dominance decoy effects widely observed in the psychological and marketing literatures are also manifested in choices regarding non-market environmental goods. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this choice anomaly carries over to subsequent valuation exercises. Specifically, we find that the average WTP for a good is significantly larger when it dominates an inferior option in a choice set than when it does not.
The demonstration of asymmetric dominance effects within choices for non-market environmental goods, and the consequential effect upon stated values is, we contend, a potentially important result. It continues the tradition noted at the start of this paper of certain anomalies being found to be common to both market-priced and non-market goods. Indeed the presence of the asymmetric dominance effect simply confirms the fact that preferences for non-markets goods are, generally speaking, not inherently different from those for market priced goods; they even share the same anomalies.
This research suggests that biases or anomalies found in other choice settings will also be found in choices regarding public environmental goods. One perspective on this result is optimistic: hypothetical decisions about public issues are subject to similar inconsistencies that are found in everyday decisions involving real commitments. However, these results also suggest 11 Rigid conformity with a random utility interpretation implies some cross-equation restrictions in equation system [3] . Specifically, a 5 b c 2 b t in order for the utility function which derives valuation to be consistent with the utility function for choice. There are good reasons to be skeptical about whether we should impose conformity here, not least statistical. Though the decoy effect on choice remains highly significant if we impose crossequation restrictions, when we test the acceptability of the restrictions against the unrestricted system presented in Table 5 , the relevant likelihood ratio test statistic is 74.0 (p 5 0.000; the critical value of the chi-square statistic for a 1% level of significance with 6 degrees of freedom is 16.81). Thus, we opt for the unrestricted model. It is also worth noting that there are major conceptual problems with imposing the restrictions that make us hesitant to override the statistical results. In the first place, the decoy effects we are testing for are not part of the random utility story, so it would be contradictory to impose conformity. It is also well-known from the preference reversal literature (e.g., Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004 ) that measures of preference elicited through choice often conflict with measures elicited through valuation. Again this suggests that imposing a 5 b c 2 b t is not a sensible starting point for testing for decoy effects. 10 Again, we examined the possibility of ''slope'' interaction effects by examining the coefficients for w*d in the first and the two second stage equations. The resulting log likelihood function was 1,163.11. The corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic, with 12 degrees of freedom, is 14.89 (p 5 0.25), indicating that we cannot reject the hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the interaction terms are zero, save the simple with-decoy binary variable.
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Bateman, Munro, and Poe: Decoy Effectscaution as researchers endeavour to expand non-market valuation analyses into decision settings involving wider and more varied choice sets. Since the early work on conjoint analysis in marketing (e.g., Green and Wind 1973; Malhotra 1982) it has been well known that the size of the choice set and the numbers of attributes can affect estimates of welfare values. In that context, commentators have demonstrated the value of including systematic explorations of the impact of choice complexity within both contingent valuation and choice experiments (Bateman et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2002; DeShazo and Fermo 2002) . Both studies recommend such a procedure to practitioners. In a similar manner, we suggest that researchers using stated preference techniques build into the instrument design tests of asymmetric dominance and the wider class of decoy effects. The likely outcome of such investigations is not immediately apparent. The design of our present study draws upon the simple binary choice approaches dominant in the experimental literature and it is feasible that the repeated choice formats and larger number of attributes typical of non-market valuation may of themselves influence the strength of such effects. Consequently, future research might consider not only the presence of asymmetric dominance effects in choice experiment studies, but also their potential development or attenuation as respondents work through such experiments.
